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Climate change has recently led many governments to undertake policy aimed at reducing CO2 
emissions.  The general purpose of such policies is to reduce production activities which have 
high carbon emissions and encourage those with low emissions and, whatever the specific 
mechanism suggested, it is almost certain that policy will have differential impacts at the 
regional level of the economy.  While these differential regional impacts will be politically 
important, very little analysis of them has yet been carried out.  This paper aims to contribute to 
the analysis of this issue.  It does so by building a small model involving two regions which are 
linked by inter-regional trade, capital flows and migration as well as by a federal fiscal system.  
We incorporate the right to emit CO2 as a factor of production with the national level of 
permitted emissions set by the national government.  We use a linear version of the model, 
calibrated using Australian data, to simulate the effects on the regions of the carbon-reduction 
policy and find that a 10% reduction has relatively small but regionally differentiated effects on 
key variables such as welfare, output and unemployment.  We also explore the effects of policies 
that may be undertaken by governments at both regional and national levels to ameliorate the 
effects of the carbon-reduction policy.  Standard fiscal policies (both regional and national) are 
generally ineffective or counter-productive while labour market policies are more useful.  
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There is considerable controversy about the existence, the nature, the causes and the 
consequences of climate change; in particular, the relationship between human activity, global 
warming and climate change is far from clear.  Yet, governments of many countries are 
beginning to pay more than lip-service to the implementation of policy designed to limit the 
emission of greenhouse gases which are claimed to be one of the main causes of  global 
warming.  The assumptions underlying such policy may be characterised as: (i) climate change 
imposes significant costs which are likely to grow; (ii) climate change is driven largely by global 
warming; (iii) global warming, in turn, is caused by an increase in the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere;  and  (iv) such gases are the result of human activity.  
Given this chain of reasoning, the policies being proposed are of the type that will limit 
the human activity which produces greenhouse gases of which carbon dioxide, CO2, is the most 
commonly discussed.  Two main alternative policies for achieving a reduction in CO2 emission 
have been proposed – a carbon tax and a “cap and trade” scheme.  The first of these is a common 
response to an external diseconomy associated with production or consumption activity, the 
emission of CO2 in this case.  It is to tax the externality so that its private and social costs are the 
same, making for a socially optimal outcome (in the absence of other externalities).  The second 
policy involves a government decision on the maximum amount of CO2 emission to be allowed 
(perhaps as part of an international agreement) and the issue of permits to pollute to this level.  
These permits are allocated to polluters in some systematic fashion and are then freely traded in a 
market.  No matter which scheme is implemented, the price of goods which are pollution-
intensive would be expected to rise relative to other goods, thus shifting consumption from high- 
to low-polluting production activity.  The imposition of such a policy would be expected to have 
widespread repercussions on the economy. 
While popular discussion of climate change, global warming and the possible policy 




pollution and the design of efficient policy has a long history in the academic literature, much of 
it pre-dating the recent popular upsurge in interest in the area.  Initial analysis tended to be partial 
equilibrium in nature, concentrating on the  market for the goods, the production of which is 
responsible for the emissions.  When pollution controls are widespread, there are likely to be 
economy-wide effects of pollution abatement policies and general equilibrium analysis becomes 
more appropriate as a tool of analysis.  While the literature dealing with the general economic 
effects of pollution and pollution-reduction policies is extensive, this is not the case, however, 
for the analysis of the regional economic impacts of pollution or pollution abatement measures.  
Yet, the costs of the implementation of emission-mitigation policies can reasonably be expected 
to affect different industries differently (after all, their purpose is to curb the activity of certain 
industries and to expand that of others) and, to the extent that industry structure differs across 
regions, the initial  cost of imposing the policies are likely to differ across regions, although 
adjustments might well occur over time to spread the regional effects more evenly. 
This is not to say that the regional effects have been neglected altogether, however.  A 
number of papers has contributed to the theoretical analysis of some of the issues at stake.  An 
early paper in the area by Beladi and Frasca (1996) builds on a previous one by Beladi and Rapp 
(1993) which was, in turn, based on the well-know Harris-Todaro model of the dual developing 
economy (see Harris and Todaro, 1970).  While it is, strictly-speaking, a two-country model, it 
can be interpreted in a  regional context and analyses the regional employment, capital allocation 
and output effects of pollution controls which have an initial impact which is regionally 
differentiated.  More recently, there has been a number of papers with models with regional 
disaggregation which focus on the welfare effects of pollution-abatement policy and address 
questions about the design of policy needed to re-establish a Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources in the face of a pollution externality; examples are those by Silva and Caplan (1997), 
Caplan and Silva (2005) and Hadjiyiannis et al. (2009).  The paper by Boucekkine and Germain 




model which in previous papers has been static. Finally, an interesting paper by Hosoe and Naito 
(2006) introduces the notion of agglomeration into the static two-region model and focuses on 
the effects of pollution (rather than pollution abatement policy) on urban structure including the 
inter-regional distribution of population. 
The increasing complexity of these theoretical models, particularly when growth is 
introduced, makes clear analytical results increasingly difficult to derive.  Indeed, Hosoe and 
Naito use numerical simulations to derive some of their conclusions.  An extreme case of the use 
of numerical simulations is found in two papers which use large-scale computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models – Klepper and Peterson (2006) and Adams (2007), both of which use 
numerical solution methods to analyse the general equilibrium effects of the imposition of 
pollution control policy, the first for the European Union and the second for Australia.  These 
models both have structures which closely mimic the economic structure of the economy being 
analysed and are calibrated using data for those economies.  Both are regionally disaggregated – 
the Klepper and Peterson application is for 16 European countries while the model used by 
Adams distinguishes the eight Australian states and territories.  They both show substantial 
differences between the regional effects of centrally imposed policy; Adams, for example, 
generates regional output reductions ranging from zero to 2.5% for a 21.1% reduction in 
emissions.  
Our paper builds on the existing literature but differs from it in the following ways.  First, 
we recognise that in the current policy environment the need to limit pollution is increasingly 
likely to be derived from obligations under international agreements so that the immediate 
question and the focus of our paper is what the economic effects of the imposition of such limits 
will be, rather than the design of welfare-maximising policy instruments which has been an 
important question in past papers.
1  Thus we take the limit as exogenously given and analyse the 
                                                 
1 For an interesting recent paper which assumes that the regional governments impose pollution limits with a central 




effects of the policy on a range of economic variables including output, per capita output, 
employment, unemployment, relative prices, consumption and welfare. 
Second, we assume that the national rather than the regional government has the 
obligation under international agreements to implement pollution-control policies but that both 
the national and the regional governments will be concerned about the possible adverse regional 
consequences of such a policy.  It is likely therefore that they will consider other policies (such 
as regionally-differentiated expenditure boosts or labour-market policies) to offset the regional 
consequences of the pollution-abatement measures.  Our paper analyses the effects of a number 
of such additional policies imposed simultaneously with the pollution-control measures.  
Third, given the questions we want to address, our model is distinct from existing ones.  
We use a simple two-region general equilibrium model which allows for inter-regional migration 
in the long run and inter-regional capital mobility.  We incorporate pollution into the model by 
assuming that the right to pollute is a factor of production (in the manner of “environmental 
capital” of Hosoe and Naito, 2006) which the firms must purchase like other factors and which 
can be substituted for other factors.  
The regional unemployment consequences of pollution-abatement policy is a serious 
policy concern in many countries and to enable us to consider this we incorporate equilibrium 
unemployment into the model using a union-firm bargaining structure to generate possible 
equilibrium deviations from full employment.   
Finally, the model has an array of government policy instruments to allow us to address 
questions about the effectiveness of possible regional and national government policy responses 
to the imposition of limits to emissions.  
While our model is small and incorporates many simplifications, it is complicated enough 
to be analytically intractable and we use it to analyse policy by linearising it, calibrating it and 
simulating the effects of a variety of shocks.  Thus, strictly-speaking, it is a CGE model but one 




which the effects of shocks are transparent.  Moreover, while we use Australian data to calibrate 
the model, it would be misleading to think of our analysis as an Australian application.  For that 
the model as it stands is too general and would require much greater detail about the actual 
structure of the Australian economy.           
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we set out the 
model.  In section three we discuss the linearisation and calibration of the model and provide 
details of the simulations designed to assess the regional effects of a pollution-reduction policy 
as well as policies that might be undertaken in order to offset the adverse effects of the tightening 
of  pollution controls.  In section four we report the results of these simulations and in section 
five we summarise our results and draw conclusions about the regional effects of an emissions-
reduction policy. 
 
2. The model 
The model which we build has two regions, each with households, firms and a regional 
government.  In addition to regional governments, there is also a national government.  The 
households and firms are optimisers. Governments at both levels are treated as exogenous but 
subject to a budget constraint. 
The firms in a region produce a single good which we assume to be different to that 
produced in the other region.  It is supplied, in the region in which it is produced, to households 
and to the regional government as tax revenue.  Households consume some, trade some with 
households in the other region and give some up to the national government as income tax.  
Governments costlessly transform the good they receive as tax revenue into a government good.  
The regional government supplies the transformed good in equal amounts to households in its 
region free of direct charge.  It finances its expenditure by a payroll tax levied on firms located in 
its region as well as its share of an income tax levied by the national government.  The national 




capita) and finances this by its share of a tax levied at a uniform rate on household incomes in 
both regions as well as revenue from the rental of emissions permits to firms.  
Output in each region is produced using four factors: land, labour, capital and the right to 
emit CO2 (environmental capital).  Land is region-specific and in fixed supply.   We assume that 
one unit of labour is supplied inelastically by each household and that households are employed 
only by firms in the region in which they live, thus excluding the possibility of households’ 
living in one region and commuting to work in the other.  Regional population and labour force 
are therefore effectively the same.  We do allow inter-regional migration in the long run, 
however, and this is one of several sources of inter-connectedness between the two regions.  We 
follow the literature in the area of fiscal federalism (see, e.g., Boadway and Flatters,1982, Myers, 
1990, Petchey, 1995, Petchey and Shapiro, 2000, Groenewold, Hagger and Madden, 2003,  
Groenewold and Hagger, 2007) and assume migration to be costless and to occur in response to 
inter-regional utility differentials.   
Capital is owned by households and is mobile across regional boundaries in both short 
and long runs.  There is no capital accumulation in the model so that the capital stock is given 
and we assume each household owns an equal share of the national capital stock. 
The national government owns the stock of pollution permits which it rents to firms 
nation-wide (just as households do the capital stock).  In the case of both the capital stock and 
the stock of permits, the inter-regional allocation is determined so as to equalise the regional 
rental rates.    
We model the labour market to allow for the possibility of unemployment in each region.  
There are many ways in which this has been achieved in recent regional literature: a fixed wage 
as in the multi-regional model of tax-competition by Ogawa et al. (2006) as well as in the two-
region model of Fuerst and Huber (2006); an efficiency-wage model as in Zenou (2006); job 
search as used by Epifani and Gancia (2005) in a model used to investigate spatial productivity 




East and West Germany; or a union-based model used by Roemer (2006).  We use a variant of 
the last; we assume that in each region firms bargain with a union which represents households.  
Bargaining is assumed to be restricted to wages and, once the wage has been agreed upon, firms 
choose employment to maximise profits.  There is no reason why employment should equal the 
labour force in equilibrium so that, as required, the model allows for equilibrium unemployment. 
There are therefore several sources of interconnectedness between the regions – inter-
regional migration, inter-regional capital flows, inter-regional flows of pollution permits, inter-
regional trade and the redistribution carried out by the national government.  We abstract from 
other possible inter-regional connections.  So, we assume that each regional government supplies 
the government good only to households living in its own region, thus abstracting from inter-
regional spillover effects in the provision of government goods.  Further, we assume that each 
firm is owned by households in the region in which it is located so that there are no inter-
regional profit flows. 
 
2.1 Households 
Households derive utility from the consumption of the two privately-produced goods as 
well as from a good supplied by regional and national governments.  We assume a representative 
household in each region and that the utility function for this household is Cobb-Douglas and 
homogeneous of degree 1:





ii i i i VC C G
    ,   i = 1, 2     
where  Vi  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
  Cji  =  real private consumption of region j’s output per household in  
     region  i, 
  Gi  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
βi , γji and δi are constants with: 
                                                 




  0 i   ,       i = 1, 2 
  0 < ji < 1,   j  =  1, 2,   i = 1, 2, 
  0 < i < 1,   i = 1, 2 
  1i + 2i + i  = 1 i  =  1, 2. 
The representative household maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint which 
requires combining quantities of the two goods.  We compute real output by deflating by the 
price of a composite good which has a price index:  
 P C = (P1)
λ(P2)
1-λ 
where Pj is the price of good j ( j = 1, 2) and λ is the share of  good 1 in total nominal output.   
The national government collects an income tax at a given rate TY which is the same in 
both regions so that the household budget constraint in region i may be written as: 
 (1-TY)Ji = (P1
 C1i +P2 C2i)/PC = P
1-λC1i +P
-λ C2i,   i= 1, 2 
where P has been used to denote the relative price P1/P2 and Ji denotes real household income in 
region i measured in terms of the composite good. Utility maximisation subject to the household 




























,   i  =1, 2. 
Households own a unit of labour each, they own the capital in the economy as a whole in equal 
shares and they own the firms in their region in equal shares.
3  They therefore receive wage 
income, capital income and profits.  Some of the labour may be unemployed in which case the 
household is paid unemployment benefits by the regional government.  The household makes 
decisions on the basis of expected labour income which is simply the sum of  the wage, Wi,  
                                                 
3 We make the simplifying assumption that only households in the region own the region’s firms (and so receive 
profit distributions) to keep to a minimum the regional interrelationships.  We do not make the same assumption 
about capital ownership since we will assume inter-regional capital mobility which requires the ability of 




weighted by the employment rate, 1-Ui, and unemployment benefits, UBi, weighted by the 
unemployment rate, Ui.  Wages, unemployment benefits, profits and capital income are all 
measured in terms of units of output of the region in which they originate. Thus, the expression 
for the income of the representative household measured in terms of the composite good is: 
(3a)  J1 = P
1-λ (ΠH1 +(1-U1)W1 + U1UB1+ RK1K1/N ) + P
-λRK2K2/N,    
(3b)    J2 = P
-λ (ΠH2 +(1-U2)W2 + U2UB2+ RK2K2/N ) + P
1-λRK1K1/N,  
where  ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i, 
RKi= capital rental rate, region i, and  
Ki = capital stock region i.   
Inter-regional migration is possible and we make the simplifying assumption that 
migration is costless and continues until utilities are equal across regions: 
(4)   V1 = V2 
We also assume that capital is mobile across regions and that in equilibrium the rates of 
return are equalised: 
(5)   RK1 = RK2. 
 
2.2 Firms 
We assume that there is a given number of firms in each region which, without loss of 
generality, we set equal to 1.  Two goods are produced in the economy and it is assumed that 
firms in each region are completely specialised so that firms in region 1 produce good 1 and in 
region 2 firms produce good 2.  Thus we can use i to index both regions and goods.  In each 
region, firms hire labour from households in their own region and capital from households across 
the country and combine them with the given supply of land to produce output.   
In the process of production they emit pollution for which they must purchase permits 
from the national government.  There are various ways in which emissions might be modelled.  




would be particularly important for addressing the question of the optimal level of  pollution 
which would balance the benefits to utility of lower pollution against the extra production costs.
 4  
However, we do not deal with this question, rather taking the level of permitted emissions as 
exogenous.  Besides, for the sort of policy environment which we have in mind, the benefits to 
households of lower CO2 emissions are likely to be much more diffused over both time and 
space that the extra costs.  On the cost side, the literature has incorporated pollution in two main 
alternative ways.  The first is to assume that pollution produced is linearly related to output – see, 
e.g., Hosoe and Naito (2006).
5  The alternative, more general approach which we also follow, is 
to treat pollution as a factor of production; see Beladi and Rapp (1993), Beladi and Frasca 
(1996), Rosendahl (2008), Hadjiyiannis et al. (2009) and Boucekkine and Germain (2009) for 
examples of this approach.    
Production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale so 
that the production function for the representative firm in region i can be written as:  

) (1 () ( ) ( ) ,
Li LiE iK i E i K i
ii i i i i YB L A N D L E K
        0, , , ( 1 ) 1 Li Ki Ei Li Ki Ei          
where   Bi =  total factor productivity in region i,  
  Ki = the total capital in region i,  
  Li = total employment in region i, and   
  Ei = pollution emission permits, region i.  
We can simplify by writing:  
) (1 ()
iL Ki Ei
ii i DB L A N D
     
so that the production function becomes: 
(6)  ()()
iL EiK i
ii i i i YD L E K
    ,     0, , , ( 1 ) 1 ,1 , 2 Li Ki Ei Li Ki Ei i          
  Consider now firms’ behaviour.  Profits (in terms of the firm’s own output) are defined 
as: 
                                                 
4 See Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan and Silva (2005) and Banzhaf and Chupp (2010), for example. 
5 An interesting recent variation is in Silva and Yamaguchi (2010) in which a separate energy good is introduced 




(7)  ΠFi = Yi – (1+TWi) WiLi – RKiKi – REiEi        j = 1, 2 
where TWi is the payroll tax levied by the regional government on the wage bill in region i  and 
REi is the emission permit rental rate in region i.  We allow for the possibility that the emission 
permit rental rate differs across regions but will generally assume it to be the same.  Even though 
we have normalised the number of firms to be 1, we assume that each firm takes the wage, the 
payroll tax rate, the capital rental rate and the emission permit rental rate as given when it 
maximises profits.  Hence the choice variables in each case are the level of employment, 
emissions and capital (which will also determine output via the production function). 
The profit-maximising conditions are the usual marginal productivity conditions: 
(8a)         (1 ) Li i Wi i i YT W L   ,   i = 1, 2 
(8b)  Kii K i i YR K   ,   i = 1, 2 
(8c)  Eii E i i YR E   ,   i = 1, 2 
On the labour supply side, each household in each region is assumed to provide one unit 
of labour inelastically to the firms in its own region so that labour force and the number of 
households are equal.  The wage is arrived at by a process of bargaining between firms and 
unions after which firms choose employment to satisfy the marginal productivity condition, 
equation (8a).  We assume that the resulting level of employment is always at most equal to the 
labour force and that generally there is (equilibrium) unemployment.   
 
2.3 Wage Bargaining 
We assume, then, that the wage in region i is determined by a process of negotiation 
between employers and trade unions. The union’s bargaining aim is to push the wage bill as high 
as possible relative to the figure they believe workers could obtain elsewhere in the region if the 
bargaining process breaks down.  In pursuing this aim, however, they are constrained by the 




assumptions, following Layard et al. (1991), by supposing that, for the representative firm in 
region i, the bargained wage is the outcome of the following optimisation problem: 
   {} max ( ) (( - ) )
i
i
ii i i i W FW A L
  ,   0<  ωi <1 
subject to (6), (7) and (8a) where Ai is the income workers expect to be able to obtain elsewhere 
in region i if an agreement is not reached and  ωi is a parameter representing union strength in 
the bargaining process in region i.  We assume that Ai depends on both the expected wage in the 
rest of the region (W
E
i) as well as unemployment benefits (UBi): 
  Ai = (1-Ui)W
E
i + UiUBi 
where (1-Ui) is taken as the probability of employment elsewhere and Ui the probability of 
unemployment, should the bargaining process break down.  Under these assumptions, the first-
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   
  
  i = 1,2, 
where the left-hand side  represents the relative benefit from being employed which must be 
balanced against profits on the right-hand side.  The higher is union bargaining power, as 
represented by ωi, the greater will be the wage relative to unemployment benefits.   
 
2.4 Governments 
There are two levels of government, a national government and two regional 
governments.  The national government levies a tax on household income at a constant rate 
across the country, the revenue from which it shares with the regional governments.  We allow 
the tax shares to differ across regions although in most federal systems they would be the same.  
The national government also receives the income from firms for the rental of emissions permits.  
The national government’s revenue is therefore: 
  T Y[(1-θ1)J1N1 + (1-θ2)J2N2] + P
1-λRE1E1 + P




where we denote the share of income tax going to region i’s government by θi and we have 
measured revenue in terms of the composite good (noting that income, Ji, is already in terms of 
the composite good).  
On the expenditure side of its budget, the national government converts its revenue into a 
government consumption good at the rate of one unit of the consumption good per unit of the 
composite good.  It provides this good to the residents of both regions on an equal per capita 
basis within each region although the per capita amount may differ across regions.  Denoting the 
government consumption good per capita supplied by the national government in region i by GNi, 
we can write the national government’s budget constraint as:   
(10)  TY[(1-θ1)J1N1 + (1-θ2)J2N2] + P
1-λRE1E1 + P
-λRE2E2  = N1GN1 + N2GN2. 
where we have assumed that the government good is private in the rival sense.   
Each of the regional governments also has its own tax, viz., a payroll tax which is levied 
on the region’s wage bill.  Regional governments receive payroll tax in the form of output 
produced in their region and use part of the revenue to pay unemployment benefits, converting 
the remainder into the government consumption good in the same way that the national 
government does.  Regional governments also convert their share of the national income tax to 
the government consumption good.  The budget constraint for the regional governments can be 
written as: 
(11a)   P
1-λ[TW1W1(1-U1) – U1UB1]+ θ1TYJ1 = GR1,  and 
(11b)  P
-λ[TW2W2(1-U2) – U2UB2]+ θ2TYJ2 = GR2,  . 
where we use GRi to denote the government good provided to residents of region i by their 
regional government and both sides of the constraint are in per capita terms.  
 
2.5 Definitions and closure 
There remains a number of definitions and market-clearing conditions which close the 




(12)     Ui = 1 – Li/Ni ,          i = 1, 2  
Next, the relationship between Gi and its components is given by:   
(13)  Gi = GRi + GNi,    i = 1, 2 
There is a given national population, N: 
(14)  N1 + N2 = N, 
a given national capital stock, K: 
(15)        K1 + K2 = K, 
and a given stock of emission permits: 
(16)        E1 + E2 = E. 
Firms are assumed to distribute all their profits to households in their own region in equal per 
capita amounts:
6  
(17)  ΠFi = NiΠHi,   i = 1, 2    
Finally, regions must “balance their budgets”, i.e. there must be balanced trade: 
(18)  N1C21 = N2 P C12. 
To summarise, the model consists of the 35 equations, (1) to (18) in 49 variables: Vi, Cji, 
Gi, GRi, P, Ji, ΠHi, Wi, REi, Di, Yi, Li, Ki, RKi Ni, ΠFi, TY, TWi, GNi, θi, N, K, Ui,  UBi, Ei, E, of 
which 13 are exogenous: Di, θi, N, K, E, two of (GRi, UBi TWi) for each i=1,2 and two of (GN1, 
TY, GN2), so that there are 36 endogenous variables:  
Vi, Cji, Gi, P, Ji, ΠHi, Wi, REi, Yi, Li, Ki, RKi Ni, ΠFi, Ui,  UBi, Ei, one of (GRi, UBi TWi) for each 
i=1,2 and one of (GN1, TY, GN2).  This leaves us one equation short which is made up by the 
condition that the emissions permit rental rate is equal across regions.  
 
2.6 Short-run and long-run versions of the model 
In the simulations to be reported below we distinguish between short-run and long-run 
versions of the model.  The distinction is very simple: we define the short run as the stretch of 
                                                 




time before inter-regional migration begins to respond to a gap between V1 and V2.  In terms of 
the model, this simply involves suspending equations (4) and (14) and making N1 and N2  
exogenous in the simulation. The long run is used to refer to the simulation results using the 
model as set out above. 
 
3. Linearisation, calibration and simulation of the model 
The model which we have set out in the previous section is non-linear and too complex to 
solve algebraically. We therefore solve it numerically and do so in linear form, converting each 
equation to proportional changes. The linearised model is given in Appendix 2.  
The linearised model is solved numerically.  To accomplish this there is a large number 
of parameters which need to be replaced with numerical values before the effects of a shock can 
be simulated.  The parameters are of two kinds.  The first are the parameters of the utility and 
production functions and the second are shares which arise during the lineariseation procedure. 
Using all the definitions and constraints in the model to ensure the numerical version of the 
model satisfies them, we are able to reduce the data required for calibration to the following: Ci, 
GRi, GNi, Li, Wi, Ni, REiEi, RKiKi, UBi(Ni-Li) and transfers from the national government to the 
regional governments.  The data used are for Australia for the period 2004-2008 and are reported 
in Appendix 3.
7  Australia has 6 states, data for which were used for the regions.  We carry out 
preliminary simulations (choosing each state in turn as region 1 and the rest of the country as 
region 2) to identify the state which is most severely affected by the reduction in permits and call 
this region 1, the high-polluting region, and the remainder of the country region 2.  
Most of the data were straightforward national accounting data but there were some 
exceptions where strong assumptions needed to be made to enable us to compute the parameters.  
First, inter-regional trade data are not available for Australia so that Ci could not be split up into 
                                                 
7 Note that using Australian data to calibrate the model does not make this an Australian application.   This is in 
contrast to large CGE models which have a more elaborate structure which is always designed to mimic the actual 




its components Cji.  On the basis of anecdotal evidence, we assumed that interstate trade is 
approximately 20% of output and used this assumption to split up C1, then splitting up C2 to 
ensure a balance of trade. 
The payments to capital and for emissions permits were more problematical. There are no 
data on capital stock or capital income for the states so that a rough value for the capital stock 
was estimated by accumulating published data on gross fixed capital formation for the longest 
period available ( from 1985(3)) and assuming a common real rate of return of 5%.  Capital 
income was then calculated by multiplying the capital stock by a rate of return of 5%.  While this 
is undoubtedly a very rough guess, it should be pointed out that these data are used only in shares 
so that it is the relativities between the regions rather than the absolute figures which are used in 
the model.  
Payments for emissions permits were even more problematical since they do not exist at 
present and we could not, therefore, use actual data to calibrate the relevant production function 
parameters.  We proceeded by using data in the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 
2008) from which we gained information that current Australian emissions of CO2  of 
650MtCO2-equivalent would cost 15,600m AUD per annum at an estimated carbon price of 24 
AUD per tonne.  These estimates were not disaggregated by state but in one of the background 
papers, Economic Modelling Technical Paper No.7, the likely effect of a 10% reduction in 
emissions on Gross State Product (GSP) was estimated and we used the ratios of these state-level 
effects to total to allocate the 15,600m AUD across the states.  The overall cost is very modest – 
1.3% of annual GDP for 2008-09 and when we ran initial simulations, the effects of a 10% 
reduction in carbon emission permits resulted in only small effects on real economic variables.  
However, the simulated effects were comparable in magnitude to those projected by Garnaut and 
simulated by Adams (2007) and our parameter values are similar to other estimates such as those 
in Keilbach (1995).  An alternative approach would have been to calibrate the production 




reported in the Garnaut background paper but this would have given us similar results. We are 
reasonably confident, therefore, that we got the order of magnitude of the resulting production 
function parameters right.  
Finally, in this section we set out the simulations which we chose to throw light on the 
issues identified in the introductory section of the paper: “what are the general regional economic 
effects of a reduction in emissions permits?” and “can regional governments and/or the national 
government implement standard fiscal and labour-market policies to offset possible adverse 
effects of the reduction in permits?” 
The simulations we carry out can be collected into two groups.  First we simply look at 
the effects of the reduction in emissions permits on the regions with each of the states as region 1 
in turn (and region 2 comprising the rest of the country), making for six simulations. We call this 
the “base case”.  We find widespread adverse effects of the reduction in permits on economic 
variables such as output, unemployment and welfare and therefore assume that either regional 
governments or the national government or both will undertake policy to ameliorate these effects 
and in the second group of simulations we examine the effectiveness of a number of such 
policies – increases in government expenditure (by both levels of government) and a reduction in 
unemployment benefits designed to reduce equilibrium unemployment.  We report these 
simulations only for one state as region 1, choosing as region 1 the state which our base case 
simulations show to be the most severely affected by the original policy (which turns out to be 
Queensland, QLD).    
In particular the simulations we have run are the following. 
1.  The effect of a unit reduction in emissions permits.  The results for this simulation are 
reported for each state as region 1 in turn with the remainder of the country being region 
2. 
2.  The effects of a unit reduction in emissions permits together with regional government 




two simulations, one where only region 1 (the more seriously affected region) responds 
by increasing expenditure and the other where the second region also increases 
expenditure (perhaps in “reaction to” region 1’s response). The results in this case are 
reported only for QLD as region 1. 
3.  The effects of a unit reduction in emissions permits together with regional government 
unemployment-benefit reductions.  In contrast to the policy in simulation 2 which might 
be termed a “Keynesian” response to unemployment, this is a classical response designed 
to increase the cost of unemployment and so reduce its incidence.  The results are 
reported only with QLD as region 1 and, again, two cases are reported – the first where 
only region 1 responds and the second where region 2 also reacts, perhaps in response to 
region 1’s policy action.   
4.  The effects of a unit reduction in emissions permits together with national government 
increases in expenditure. The results are reported only with QLD as region 1 and, in this 
simulation too, two cases are reported – the first where only expenditure in region 1 is 
increased and second where the national government also raises expenditure in region 2.  
 
4. The results 
In this section we report the results of the simulations set out in the previous section, 
beginning with the effects simply of the imposition of a reduction in emissions limits (the “base 
case”) and then going on to combine this with a number of policies which governments might be 
expected to implement to offset the adverse effects of the pollution limitations. 
 
4.1 The base case 
We begin with the base case in which we shock the national stock of emissions permits 
by -1%.   The effects on the main variables for both regions in the short run and the long run are 




[Table 1 about here] 
Consider first the case where NSW is region 1, starting with the short-run effects.  The 
immediate effect is to reduce the use of carbon permits in each region, more in region 2 than 
region 1 since region 2 has a higher emissions level in the data base which transforms into a 
higher coefficient of the right to pollute factor in the production function.
8     The fall in the use 
of permits is accompanied by a fall in output in both regions, larger in region 2 than in region 1 
as well as fall in the relative price. In this sense the effects are what would be anticipated on the 
basis of standard partial equilibrium analysis: within the fall in national output, there has been a 
re-allocation of output from the high- to the low-pollution region/industry and a rise in the 
relative price of the high-pollution output. The falls in output flow into falls in profits, 
employment and wages with the falls, again, being larger for region 2 than for region 1.  The 
unemployment rate rises in each region.  The fall in output in each region leads to a fall in the 
return to capital and in the absence of capital mobility this would be greater in region 2 than 
region 1.  However, capital mobility ensures a common return to capital so that capital flows 
from region 2 to region 1.  With the fall in wages and profits and so in income, consumption of 
each good falls in both regions (to match the fall in output) and welfare falls, with a greater fall 
in region 2 than in region 1.  
The signs of the effects of the abatement policy are therefore easily explained in terms of 
the model structure.  The magnitudes are small, surprisingly so perhaps.  Thus a 10% reduction 
in emissions (which is a figure commonly cited in public debate in Australia and elsewhere), 
causes a fall in output of only around 0.2% in each region and an increase in the unemployment 
rate of about 0.01 percentage points; even for QLD which is hardest hit, the increase in the 
unemployment rate is only about twice this magnitude. Yet, as already mentioned in our 
discussion of calibration, these are magnitudes similar to those reported by Garnaut (2008) and 
Adams (2007).  Garnaut projects output losses of about 0.1 percentage points for a 10% 
                                                 




reduction in emissions and Adams predicts a fall in output of about 1.3% for a 21.1% reduction 
in emissions as a result of the imposition of an emissions-trading scheme.  Thus, in the short run, 
the effects on output, unemployment and welfare are small but adverse and differ across regions. 
In the long run, households move between regions in response to welfare differences. 
Since utility of the representative household in region 2 falls by more than it does in region 1 in 
the short run, people move from region 2 to region 1.  This puts further downward pressure on 
the wage in region 1 and increases employment but not by enough to absorb all the new labour 
market entrants; the level of output rises but by less than the population so that, in the transition 
to the long run, output per capita falls.  The opposite happens in region 2 – as people move out, 
output and employment fall but by less than population so that output per capita rises and the 
unemployment rate falls (relative to the short run).  The relative price of region 2’s output falls 
further. Finally, welfare improves in region 2 but worsens in region 1.  Thus, in the long run 
internal migration results in some equalisation of the effects across the two regions – output per 
capita and unemployment effects are brought closer together and welfare effects are equalised 
(by assumption). 
These results are more or less the same whichever state is chosen as region 1 with the 
exception of QLD.  This state is the only one to be harder hit by the policy than average so that 
the relative regional effects are reversed when QLD is chosen as region 1.  We presume, 
therefore, that the QLD government is most likely to use policy or advocate that the national 
government implement policy to offset the adverse regional consequences (even though these 
turn out to be small).  Further simulations will focus on the case of QLD as region 1.  
 
4.2 The effects of offsetting government policy: an increase in regional government expenditure 
The next group of simulations are ones in which we combine the emissions reduction 
with policy intended to offset the adverse effects on output and unemployment.  Such policy may 




these is reported in this sub-section and the results are given in Table 2 in which we investigate 
the case where the offsetting policy is an increase in expenditure by the regional government. 
The first set of results in Table 2 simply repeat the base case for QLD as region 1, taken from 
Table 1, with the second set of results adding an increase in GR in region 1 (the worse affected 
region) and the third set assuming that both regions attempt to offset the fall in output and 
increase in unemployment by an expenditure boosts.  
When only region 1’s government increases its expenditure the results are as follows.  
Compared to the base case (no policy reaction), the fall in output is now larger for region 1 and 
smaller for region 2 with a consequently greater increase in unemployment for region 1 and a 
marginally larger increase in region 2.  This unemployment effect reflects a larger fall in 
employment in region 1 than when the regional government did nothing, the reason for which is 
the rise in the payroll tax needed to balance the regional government’s budget – this reduces both 
wages and employment considerably in region 1 and marginally in region 2.  Thus region 1’s 
response to the reduction in emission permits seems to have been counter-productive – the fall in 
output (and output per capita) is greater and the rise in the unemployment rate is higher 
compared to the case where the government did nothing. Even region 2 seems to have been fared 
slightly worse as a result of the reaction of the other region’s government.  Despite this perverse 
effect, however, welfare in region 1 has been improved due to the direct effect of the expenditure 
boost on utility, while that in region 2 has worsened slightly.  Thus, in the short run at least, the 
government of region 1 has been able to improve the lot of its citizens at the expense of that of 
those living in region 2. 
The reversal of the relative welfare effects causes households to migrate from region 2 to 
region 1 in the long run.  This substantially offsets the short-run fall in output in region 1 but still 
leaves output per capita lower and the unemployment rate higher. The effect on region 2 is the 
opposite – output falls further but output per capita rises and the unemployment rate falls.  




of the reduction in emissions permits are effectively unchanged by the policy reaction of the 
government of region 1. 
In summary, the results of region 1’s government’s expenditure boost are perverse for 
output, output per capita and the unemployment rate but “inadvertently” beneficial for welfare 
(with small costs for region 2) in the short run.  In the long run, however, region 1’s policy is 
completely counter-productive – output per capita falls by more and the unemployment rate rises 
by more than they would have done in the absence of the policy and welfare is largely 
unaffected. 
Consider now what happens if the governments of both regions react to the emissions-
permits cut by increasing expenditure by the same proportion, comparing the result to those 
when only region 1’s government reacts.  In the short run the fall in output and per capita output 
is smaller in region 1 but larger in region 2, while the rise in the unemployment rate is greater for 
both regions, considerably so for region 2.  Thus, from the point of view of per capita output and 
unemployment, the decision by region 2 to increase its expenditure given that region 1 has 
“already” done this seems counterproductive.  However, from a welfare point of view, the 
decision by region 2’s government to join the fray has a small benefit although at considerable 
cost to region 1’s citizens. 
In the long run there is migration from region 1 to region 2, boosting output in region 2 
but not by as much as population so that output per capita is lower, and the unemployment rate 
higher than it would otherwise have been.  In the long run welfare is lower in both regions than it 
would have been had neither regional government reacted or had region 1 alone reacted. 
In summary, if a regional government reacts to the loss of output and employment by 
increasing expenditure, the results are counter-productive – output per capita is lower and the 
unemployment rate is higher than in the absence of the expenditure increase.  In the short run 
there is a welfare benefit to the citizens of the region in which the government acts but this 




4.3 The effects of offsetting government policy: a cut in unemployment benefits 
The next regional government policy reaction we consider is a cut in unemployment 
benefits which a government might do in the hope of reducing the unemployment consequences 
of the cut in emissions permits imposed by the national government.  As explained in the 
previous section, we might consider this a “classical” rather than a “Keynesian” response to the 
emergence of unemployment. We again assume that the endogenous variable in the regional 
government’s budget constraint is the payroll tax rate.  The results for this simulation are 
reported in Table 3 where we have again repeated the effects of an emissions permits cut in the 
first two columns of results and then those for the case where only region 1’s government reacts, 
followed by the case where region 2’s government also reacts. 
[Table 3 about here] 
When only regions 1’s government changes the level of unemployment benefits, the 
“immediate” short run effect is on the labour market and on the bargaining process in region 1 in 
particular.  The wage rate still falls as a result of the emissions cut but by less than in the absence 
of offsetting policy and employment actually rises instead of falling.  The fall in emissions 
permits and the rise in employment act in opposite directions on output and, given the relative 
shock sizes (and, of course, the model parameters) the overall effect in this simulation is to 
reduce output but by less than in the base case.  Output per capita also falls by less.  Under the 
dual effects of the fall in unemployment benefits and the fall in payroll taxes needed to balance 
the budget, the unemployment rate actually falls.  Finally, welfare still falls but by less than it 
would have had the regional government not responded by cutting unemployment benefits.  
Thus, the decision of the regional government to cut unemployment benefits in response to the 
national government’s reduction in emissions permits is beneficial in all dimensions (per capita 
output, employment, unemployment and welfare).  It is not without cost to region 2, however.  In 
particular, the boost to region 1’s output partially reverses the relative price change generated by 




unemployment rises by more.  Despite this, region 2 is also made slightly less worse-off  because 
the relative price effect allows residents of both regions to increase their consumption of region 
1’s output relative to the base case. 
In the long run, the utility gap opened up in favour of region 2 induces migration from 
region 1 to region 2 although the size of the migration flow is smaller than it would have been in 
the absence of region 1’s policy response.  There is also a capital flow from region 1 to region 2 
in response to changes in the relative rates of return but, again, smaller than in the base case.  
These combine to make for a boost in employment and output in region 2 relative to region 1 
although the per capita output magnitudes move in the opposite direction.  Finally, welfare in 
both regions falls by less than it did in the base case so that the policy response by region 1’s 
government makes the residents of both regions better-off in the long run. 
The final two columns in Table 3 show the effects when region 2’s government also 
reacts by reducing its unemployment benefits (matched by a payroll tax cut).   In the short run 
employment now increases in both regions (with the increase in region 1 being similar in 
magnitude to that which occurred when only region 1 reacted)  but a larger outflow of capital 
from region 1 (due to enhanced marginal product of capital in region 2) leaves output in region 1 
smaller (although not compared to the base case).  In both regions the unemployment rate now 
falls.  Finally, the welfare loss in region 1 is now smaller than it was when only region 1 acted 
while region 2 is actually better-off than in the initial equilibrium.  Thus, in the short run, there 
are clear benefits to region 2 of its government also reacting to the imposition of a reduction in 
emissions permits and this benefit is at no appreciable cost to region 1. 
In the long run the welfare gap in favour of region 2 attracts migrants from region 1 
which further boosts employment in region 2 and more than offsets the short-run employment 
gains in region 1.  The consequence is that unemployment falls further in region 2 but rises 
slightly in region 1 relative to the short run.  Output follows the same pattern with that in region 




developments, there is still a welfare loss in both regions relative to the initial equilibrium 
although this reduction is considerably smaller than when neither regional government or only 
one regional government reacts to the reduction in emissions permits.  There are, therefore, 
distinct benefits to each of the regions of both regional governments responding to the national 
government’s pollution reduction policy by reducing unemployment benefits.  This is in contrast 
to the ineffectiveness of a traditional fiscal response of a tax-financed increase in government 
expenditure. 
 
4.4 The effects of offsetting government policy: an increase in national government expenditure 
The final case in this second group of simulations is where the national government 
increases its expenditure (financed from income tax) at the same time that it imposes the cut in 
pollution permits.  It seems likely that there will be pressure from many quarters, including 
regional governments, for the national government to “do something about” the feared adverse 
consequences of it pollution-abatement policy.  In Table 4 we explore two possible reactions: a 
rise in national government expenditure in region 1 and a rise in expenditure in both regions.  In 
both cases we assume that the national government balances its budget by adjusting income 
taxes.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Consider first the case where the national government increases expenditure only in 
region1, the region expected to be hit hardest by the reduction in emissions permits.  The 
consequence is that output and output per capita still fall in both regions but by less in each case 
than when the government does not engage in an offsetting expenditure increase.  Similarly, the 
fall in employment and wages are less than in the base case so that unemployment rates are 
lower than they would have been in the absence of the national government’s action.  The reason 
for this favourable output effect is that the national government increases income tax to maintain 




able to reduce payroll taxes which boost employment and wages.  This effect operates in both 
regions.  Profits still fall in both regions because of the tightening of pollution controls and so the 
income change, though positive, is smaller than the increase in income tax so that consumption 
of both goods falls.  Welfare therefore falls in region 2 but rises in region 1 because of the direct 
effect on utility of the national government’s increase in expenditure. 
In the long run the differential welfare effects cause households to migrate from region 2 
to region 1, reinforcing the favourable short-run output effects in region 1 but offsetting them in 
region 2.  The resulting output increase in region 1 is insufficient to absorb the extra labour so 
that the unemployment rate rises in the long run in region 1 while it falls for the opposite reason 
in region 2.  In the long run the national government’s policy has made little difference to 
welfare – it still falls in both regions although by slightly less than it did in the base case. 
Although there will be pressure for the national government to act in the region most 
affected by the emissions reduction, it is likely that in the interests of fairness, the government 
will act in both regions and the second set of results in Table 4 shows the economic effects of the 
national government’s increasing expenditure by the same proportion in both regions. The 
immediate result is, not surprisingly, a much larger increase in income tax needed to balance its 
budget (in our data base region 2 is about four times the size or region 1) and, consequently 
given the tax-sharing assumptions, a much larger cut in payroll tax is possible in both regions.  
This has the effect of increasing employment in both regions, thus offsetting the negative effects 
on output of the reduction in allowable pollution.  The main difference to the previous case, 
where expenditure was increased only in region 1, is that the households in region 2 now also 
benefit from the direct utility effects of the increase in expenditure.  Indeed, the incomes tax 
increase is so much greater now, that region 1 actually suffers a welfare loss, although not as 
large as in the base case.   
The short-run welfare effects now mean that there is migration from region 1 to region 2 




capita magnitudes move in the opposite direction.  In the long run the unemployment rate falls 
and welfare falls in both regions but the latter by less than in the base case.  Thus both from an 
unemployment and a welfare perspective, the policy is worthwhile in that it benefits both regions 
relative to the base case 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated some of the regional economic consequences of the 
imposition by the national government of a policy to reduce carbon emissions.  We did this in 
the context of a small two-region model in which we modelled pollution by assuming that firms 
have to rent permits to pollute from the national government and these permits are treated like a 
factor in the production function.  We also assessed the effects of a number of possible policies 
which might be undertaken by either regional governments or the national government in 
response to the adverse impacts of the tightening of pollution controls on output, unemployment 
and welfare.  The various questions were analysed using a series of numerical simulations of the 
model. 
Broadly, the simulation results show that the economic effects of a substantial reduction 
in emissions are adverse but small.  Secondly, we show that some policies designed to reduce the 
negative regional economic impacts of the cut in emissions permits are ineffective, some are 
counter-productive and others are effective.  Thus, in general, policies which involve increasing 
government expenditure in the regions (either by the regional governments of by the national 
government) have relatively small effects or are even counter-productive.  On the other hand, a 
reduction in unemployment benefits financed by a payroll tax cut can offsets the adverse welfare 
effects of the national government’s pollution-abatement policy.  This is especially so when the 
offsetting policy is implemented in both regions rather than being concentrated in the worse-
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Table 1 Base Case: Effects of a Reduction in Carbon Emission (e=-1) 
Region 1 = NSW  Region 1 = VIC Region 1 = QLD  Region 1 = SA  Region 1 = WA  Region 1 = TAS
Var 
SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1 -0.0205  -0.0226  -0.0188  -0.0226 -0.0398 -0.0226 -0.0102 -0.0226 -0.0162  -0.0228  -0.0211 -0.0226
v2 -0.0237  -0.0226  -0.0239  -0.0226 -0.0182 -0.0226 -0.0236 -0.0226 -0.0235  -0.0228  -0.0226 -0.0226
c11 -0.0247  -0.0251  -0.0224  -0.0230 -0.0593 -0.0591 -0.0092 -0.0143 -0.0186  -0.0147  -0.0291 -0.0298
c21 -0.0315  -0.0435  -0.0314  -0.0528 -0.0217 0.0894 -0.0307 -0.0914 -0.0305  -0.0883  -0.0291 -0.0367
c12 -0.0247  -0.0129  -0.0224  -0.0015 -0.0593 -0.1705 -0.0092 0.0468 -0.0186  0.0426  -0.0291 -0.0223
c22 -0.0315  -0.0313  -0.0314  -0.0312 -0.0217 -0.0220 -0.0307 -0.0303 -0.0305  -0.0310  -0.0291 -0.0291
j1 -0.0230  -0.0310  -0.0230  -0.0390 -0.0230 0.0661 -0.0230 -0.0796 -0.0230  -0.0742  -0.0230 -0.0304
j2 -0.0230  -0.0189  -0.0230  -0.0174 -0.0230 -0.0454 -0.0230 -0.0186 -0.0230  -0.0168  -0.0230 -0.0228
πh1 -0.0184  -0.0196  -0.0160  -0.0183 -0.0526 -0.0427 -0.0019 -0.0121 -0.0123  -0.0139  -0.0210 -0.0222
πh2 -0.0248  -0.0243  -0.0249  -0.0240 -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0242 -0.0233 -0.0239  -0.0239  -0.0226 -0.0226
w1 -0.0187  -0.0218  -0.0165  -0.0227 -0.0533 -0.0200 -0.0034 -0.0304 -0.0126  -0.0266  -0.0235 -0.0272
w2 -0.0255  -0.0239  -0.0255  -0.0232 -0.0157 -0.0240 -0.0247 -0.0226 -0.0246  -0.0231  -0.0232 -0.0231
l1 -0.0006  0.0075  -0.0005  0.0153 -0.0016 -0.0890 -0.0001 0.0552 -0.0003  0.0506  -0.0011 0.0061
l2 -0.0008  -0.0048  -0.0008  -0.0062 -0.0005 0.0223 -0.0007 -0.0053 -0.0008  -0.0069  -0.0007 -0.0009
k1 0.0044  0.0116  0.0068  0.0208 -0.0297 -0.1081 0.0208 0.0678 0.0098 0.0563 0.0016 0.0078
k2 -0.0020  -0.0053  -0.0021  -0.0065 0.0077 0.0281 -0.0014 -0.0045 -0.0019  -0.0110  0.0000 -0.0001
rk1 -0.0228  -0.0230  -0.0227  -0.0230 -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0228 -0.0234 -0.0220  -0.0190  -0.0226 -0.0226
rk2 -0.0228  -0.0230  -0.0227  -0.0230 -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0228 -0.0234 -0.0220  -0.0190  -0.0226 -0.0226
e1 -0.9955  -0.9881  -0.9929  -0.9780 -1.0227 -1.0828 -0.9782 -0.9291 -0.9892  -0.9380  -0.9984 -0.9922
e2 -1.0019  -1.0050  -1.0017  -1.0054 -0.9854 -0.9466 -1.0004 -1.0014 -1.0009  -1.0053  -1.0000 -1.0002
re1 0.9771  0.9767  0.9769  0.9758 0.9702 0.9518 0.9763 0.9735 0.9770 0.9753 0.9774 0.9774
re2 0.9771  0.9767  0.9769  0.9758 0.9702 0.9518 0.9763 0.9735 0.9770 0.9753 0.9774 0.9774
y1 -0.0184  -0.0114  -0.0160  -0.0022 -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0019 0.0443 -0.0123  0.0373  -0.0210 -0.0148
y2 -0.0248  -0.0283  -0.0249  -0.0296 -0.0152 0.0052 -0.0242 -0.0280 -0.0239  -0.0300  -0.0226 -0.0228
n1 0.0000  0.0081  0.0000  0.0161 0.0000 -0.0884 0.0000 0.0564 0.0000 0.0512 0.0000 0.0074
n2 0.0000  -0.0040  0.0000  -0.0055 0.0000 0.0231 0.0000 -0.0047 0.0000  -0.0061  0.0000 -0.0002
y1-n1  -0.0184 -0.0195  -0.016  -0.0183 -0.0526 -0.0426 -0.0019 -0.0121 -0.0123  -0.0139  -0.021 -0.0222
y2-n2  -0.0248 -0.0243  -0.0249  -0.0241 -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0242 -0.0233 -0.0239  -0.0239 -0.0226 -0.0226
πf1 -0.0184  -0.0114  -0.0160  -0.0022 -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0019 0.0443 -0.0123  0.0373  -0.0210 -0.0148
πf2 -0.0248  -0.0283  -0.0249  -0.0296 -0.0152 0.0052 -0.0242 -0.0280 -0.0239  -0.0300  -0.0226 -0.0228
p -0.0068  -0.0184  -0.0090  -0.0297 0.0376 0.1485 -0.0215 -0.0771 -0.0119  -0.0736  0.0000 -0.0068
u1 0.0104  0.0122  0.0101  0.0138 0.0354 0.0133 0.0025 0.0220 0.0070 0.0148 0.0175 0.0203
u2 0.0161  0.0151  0.0154  0.0140 0.0093 0.0142 0.0147 0.0135 0.0150 0.0142 0.0140 0.0139
tw1 0.0100  0.0327  0.0106  0.0536 0.0228 -0.2084 0.0119 0.1421 0.0070 0.1591 0.0199 0.0353
tw2 0.0145  0.0039  0.0138  -0.0015 0.0105 0.0703 0.0131 0.0000 0.0139  0.0001  0.0128 0.0123
ty 0.0322  0.0322  0.0322  0.0326 0.0322 0.0325 0.0322 0.0328 0.0322 0.0307 0.0322 0.0323
e -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000 -1.0000
Notes: The symbols in the first column are the proportional changes of their upper-case counterparts; thus, for 
example, v1 is the proportional change in V1. NWS, VIC, QLD, SA, WA and TAS are Australian states New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania respectively. SR and LR are 
abbreviations of  “short run” and “long run”. Since yj and nj are log differences of output and population 





Table 2 Effects of an Increase in Regional Government Expenditure 
e = -1  e = -1 and gr1 =1  e = -1 and gr1=1, gr2=1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  -0.0398 -0.0226 -0.0157 -0.0225 -0.0432 -0.0276 
v2  -0.0182 -0.0226 -0.0243 -0.0225 -0.0236 -0.0276 
c11  -0.0593 -0.0591 -0.2715 -0.2716 -0.2669 -0.2668 
c21  -0.0217  0.0894 -0.0191 -0.0630 -0.2158 -0.1150 
c12  -0.0593 -0.1705 -0.2715 -0.2276 -0.2669 -0.3679 
c22  -0.0217 -0.0220 -0.0191 -0.0190 -0.2158 -0.2161 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.6716 0.6716 0.6716 0.6716 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6565 0.6565 
j1  -0.0230  0.0661 -0.0593 -0.0945 -0.1882 -0.1073 
j2  -0.0230 -0.0454 -0.0593 -0.0505 -0.1882 -0.2085 
πh1  -0.0526 -0.0427 -0.0589 -0.0628 -0.0578 -0.0488 
πh2  -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0149 -0.0139 -0.0201 -0.0226 
w1  -0.0533 -0.0200 -0.2976 -0.3108 -0.3096 -0.2794 
w2  -0.0157 -0.0240 -0.0216 -0.0183 -0.2613 -0.2688 
l1  -0.0016 -0.0890 -0.0091  0.0254 -0.0095 -0.0888 
l2  -0.0005 0.0223 -0.0007  -0.0097  -0.0079 0.0128 
k1  -0.0297 -0.1081 -0.0349 -0.0039 -0.0299 -0.1011 
k2  0.0077 0.0281 0.0091 0.0010 0.0078 0.0263 
rk1  -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0240 -0.0240 -0.0279 -0.0280 
rk2  -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0240 -0.0240 -0.0279 -0.0280 
e1  -1.0227 -1.0828 -1.0267 -1.0030 -1.0229 -1.0774 
e2  -0.9854 -0.9466 -0.9828 -0.9981 -0.9852 -0.9501 
re1  0.9702 0.9518 0.9678 0.9751 0.9651 0.9484 
re2  0.9702 0.9518 0.9678 0.9751 0.9651 0.9484 
y1  -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0589 -0.0279 -0.0578 -0.1290 
y2  -0.0152  0.0052 -0.0149 -0.0230 -0.0201 -0.0017 
n1  0.0000  -0.0884 0.0000 0.0349 0.0000  -0.0802 
n2  0.0000 0.0231 0.0000  -0.0091 0.0000 0.0209 
y1-n1  -0.0526 -0.0426 -0.0589 -0.0628 -0.0578 -0.0488
y2-n2  -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0149 -0.0139 -0.0201 -0.0226
πf1  -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0589 -0.0279 -0.0578 -0.1290 
πf2  -0.0152  0.0052 -0.0149 -0.0230 -0.0201 -0.0017 
p  0.0376 0.1485 0.2524 0.2086 0.0511 0.1518 
u1  0.0354 0.0133 0.1975 0.2063 0.2055 0.1854 
u2  0.0093 0.0142 0.0128 0.0109 0.1545 0.1590 
tw1  0.0228  -0.2084 2.3463 2.4376 2.4735 2.2636 
tw2  0.0105 0.0703 0.0757 0.0521 2.5737 2.6280 
ty  0.0322 0.0325 0.0525 0.0524 0.1984 0.1986 
e  -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 
Notes: The symbols in the first column is the proportional changes of their upper-case counterparts; 
thus, for example, v1 is the proportional change in V1. SR and LR are abbreviations of  “short run” and 
“long run”. Since yj and nj are log differences of output and population respectively, yj-nj is the log 
difference of output per capita. 
    
Table 3 Effects of a Reduction in Unemployment Benefits 
Base Case, e = -1  e = -1, ub1=-1 e=  =-1,  ub1=-1,ub2=-1  Variable 
SR LR SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.0398  -0.0226 -0.0227 -0.0185 -0.0193 -0.0020 
v2 -0.0182  -0.0226 -0.0174  -0.0185  0.0024  -0.0020 
c11  -0.0593  -0.0591 -0.0314 -0.0313 -0.0325 -0.0324 
c21  -0.0217  0.0894 -0.0220 0.0052 0.0049 0.1163 
c12  -0.0593  -0.1705 -0.0314 -0.0585 -0.0325 -0.1442 
c22 -0.0217  -0.0220 -0.0220  -0.0221  0.0049  0.0045 
j1 -0.0230  0.0661 -0.0188  0.0029  -0.0020  0.0874 
j2  -0.0230  -0.0454 -0.0188 -0.0243 -0.0020 -0.0245 
πh1  -0.0526  -0.0427 -0.0259 -0.0235 -0.0319 -0.0220 
πh2 -0.0152  -0.0179 -0.0167  -0.0173  0.0055  0.0027 
w1  -0.0533  -0.0200 -0.0265 -0.0184 -0.0320  0.0014 
w2 -0.0157  -0.0240 -0.0171  -0.0191  0.0054  -0.0029 
l1  -0.0016  -0.0890 0.0298 0.0085 0.0296  -0.0580 
l2  -0.0005  0.0223 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0306 0.0535 
k1  -0.0297  -0.1081 -0.0073 -0.0265 -0.0297 -0.1083 
k2  0.0077  0.0281 0.0019 0.0069 0.0077 0.0282 
rk1  -0.0229  -0.0230 -0.0186 -0.0186 -0.0023 -0.0023 
rk2  -0.0229  -0.0230 -0.0186 -0.0186 -0.0023 -0.0023 
e1  -1.0227  -1.0828 -1.0056 -1.0203 -1.0227 -1.0830 
e2  -0.9854  -0.9466 -0.9964 -0.9869 -0.9854 -0.9465 
re1  0.9702  0.9518 0.9797 0.9752 0.9908 0.9724 
re2  0.9702  0.9518 0.9797 0.9752 0.9908 0.9724 
y1  -0.0526  -0.1310 -0.0259 -0.0450 -0.0319 -0.1106 
y2 -0.0152  0.0052 -0.0167  -0.0117  0.0055  0.0259 
n1 0.0000  -0.0884 0.0000  -0.0216  0.0000  -0.0887 
n2  0.0000  0.0231 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0231 
y1-n1  -0.0526 -0.0426 -0.0259 -0.0234 -0.0319  -0.0219
y2-n2  -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0167 -0.0173 0.0055  0.0028
πf1  -0.0526  -0.1310 -0.0259 -0.0450 -0.0319 -0.1106 
πf2 -0.0152  0.0052 -0.0167  -0.0117  0.0055  0.0259 
p  0.0376  0.1485 0.0094 0.0365 0.0374 0.1487 
u1  0.0354 0.0133 -0.6461 -0.6515 -0.6425 -0.6647 
u2 0.0093  0.0142 0.0101  0.0113  -0.5945  -0.5896 
ub1  0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 
ub2 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000 
tw1  0.0228  -0.2084 -0.2760 -0.3325 -0.2798 -0.5118 
tw2 0.0105  0.0703 0.0099  0.0246  -0.3153  -0.2553 
ty  0.0322  0.0325 0.0264 0.0264 0.0028 0.0031 
e  -1.0000  -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 
Notes: The symbols in the first column is the proportional changes of their upper-case counterparts; 
thus, for example, v1 is the proportional change in V1. SR and LR are abbreviations of  “short run” and 
“long run”. Since yj and nj are log differences of output and population respectively, yj-nj is the log 
difference of output per capita. 
    
Table 4 Effects of a National Government Expenditure Increase 
Base Case, e = -1  e = -1, gn1=1  e = -1,gn1=1,gn2=1 
Variable 
LR SR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.0398 -0.0226 0.0223  -0.0211  -0.0340  -0.0182 
v2  -0.0182 -0.0226 -0.0322  -0.0211  -0.0141  -0.0182 
c11  -0.0593 -0.0591 -0.0766  -0.0770  -0.1492  -0.1490 
c21  -0.0217 0.0894 -0.0396 -0.3195 -0.1149 -0.0126 
c12  -0.0593 -0.1705 -0.0766  0.2037  -0.1492  -0.2516 
c22  -0.0217 -0.0220 -0.0396  -0.0388  -0.1149  -0.1152 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.3284  0.3284  0.3284  0.3284 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.3436  0.3436 
j1  -0.0230 0.0661 0.0055 -0.2189  0.1245  0.2065 
j2  -0.0230 -0.0454 0.0055  0.0618  0.1245  0.1039 
πh1  -0.0526 -0.0427 -0.0517  -0.0767  -0.0481  -0.0390 
πh2  -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0143  -0.0074  -0.0107  -0.0132 
w1  -0.0533 -0.0200 -0.0107  -0.0946  0.1677  0.1984 
w2  -0.0157 -0.0240 0.0270  0.0479  0.2055  0.1979 
l1  -0.0016 -0.0890 -0.0003  0.2197  0.0051  -0.0753 
l2  -0.0005 0.0223 0.0008 -0.0566  0.0063  0.0273 
k1  -0.0297 -0.1081 -0.0297  0.1678  -0.0297  -0.1019 
k2  0.0077 0.0281 0.0077 -0.0436  0.0077  0.0265 
rk1  -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0220  -0.0219  -0.0184  -0.0185 
rk2  -0.0229 -0.0230 -0.0220  -0.0219  -0.0184  -0.0185 
e1  -1.0227 -1.0828 -1.0227  -0.8714  -1.0227  -1.0781 
e2  -0.9854 -0.9466 -0.9853  -1.0829  -0.9853  -0.9497 
re1  0.9702 0.9518 0.9710  1.0174  0.9747  0.9577 
re2  0.9702 0.9518 0.9710  1.0174  0.9747  0.9577 
y1  -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0517  0.1460  -0.0481  -0.1204 
y2  -0.0152 0.0052 -0.0143 -0.0655 -0.0107  0.0080 
n1  0.0000 -0.0884 0.0000  0.2226  0.0000  -0.0814 
n2  0.0000 0.0231 0.0000 -0.0581  0.0000  0.0212 
y1-n1  -0.0526 -0.0426 -0.0517 -0.0766 -0.0481  -0.039
y2-n2  -0.0152 -0.0179 -0.0143 -0.0074 -0.0107  -0.0132
πf1  -0.0526 -0.1310 -0.0517  0.1460  -0.0481  -0.1204 
πf2  -0.0152 0.0052 -0.0143 -0.0655 -0.0107  0.0080 
p  0.0376 0.1485 0.0370 -0.2425  0.0343  0.1364 
u1  0.0354 0.0133 0.0071  0.0628 -0.1113 -0.1317 
u2  0.0093 0.0142 -0.0160 -0.0283 -0.1215 -0.1170 
tw1  0.0228 -0.2084 -0.3853  0.1973  -2.0919  -2.3049 
tw2  0.0105 0.0703 -0.4351 -0.5859 -2.2983 -2.2432 
ty  0.0322 0.0325 0.2753  0.2747  1.2919  1.2921 
e  -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000 
Notes: The symbols in the first column is the proportional changes of their upper-case counterparts; 
thus, for example, v1 is the proportional change in V1. SR and LR are abbreviations of  “short run” and 
“long run”. Since yj and nj are log differences of output and population respectively, yj-nj is the log 






 Appendix 1: A list of variables   
Vi = utility of the representative household, region i, 
C1i = real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
C2i = real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
Gi = real government-provided consumption per household, region i, 
GRi = amount of regional government provided per household, region i,  
GNi = amount of national government provided good per household, region i, 
P = price of good 2 in terms of good 1,  
Ji = real household income in region i, 
ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i, 
Wi = real wage per worker, region i,   
REi = emission permit rental rate, region i,  
Di = productivity parameter, region i,   
Yi = output of the representative firm, region i, 
Li = employment, in region i,  
Ki = capital, region i, 
RKi =capital rental rate, 
Ni =workforce (= population), region i, 
ΠFi = real profit per firm, region i, 
TY  = income tax, 
TWi= payroll tax, region I, 
θi = share of national income tax to region i 
N = national population. 
K = national capital 
Ui = unemployment rate, region i, 
UBi= real unemployment benefits per unemployed person, region i, 
Ei  = pollution emission, region i 






Appendix 2: The linearised version of the model 
The model is linearised in terms of proportional differences by taking 
logarithms and differentials of each equation.  The linearised form of equations (1) to 
(18) are as follows, with the linearised form having the same number as the original 
equation but being distinguished by a prime.  
The linearised utility function is: 
(1’)    11 22 ii ii i i i vc cg                              i = 1, 2 
where lower-case letters represent the proportional changes (log differential) of their 
upper-case counterparts. 
The linearised consumption demand functions are: 
(2a’)   1 (1 ) iT Y Y i cp t j                                            i = 1, 2 
(2b’)   2iT Y Y i cpt j                                            i = 1, 2 
where σTY =TY/(1-TY). 
The linearised definitions of real household income are: 
(3a’)  11 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 [(1 ) ( ) ( ) J H H H HW U HUB jp h w u u u b                  
              11 1 2 2 2 () ] ( ) HK K JK K rk n p rk n            
where 
1-
11 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
[( 1 - ) / ] K
JH




















11 1 1 1 1 1
(1- )




















11 1 1 1 1 1
/






























(3b’)  22 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 [( ) ( ) J H H H HW U HUB jp h w u u u b                 
              22 2 1 11 () ] ( ( 1 ) ) HK K JK K rk n p rk n            
where 
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(4’)     12 vv  .  
The capital allocation equilibrium condition is: 
(5’)    rK1 = rK2    
The linearised production functions are: 
(6’)    iiE i iL i iK i i yd e l k               i = 1, 2. 
The linearised profit definitions, rewritten as output equations, are given by: 






































  . 
The profit-maximisation conditions in linear form are: 
(8a’)   i TWi Wi i i yt w l     ,   i = 1, 2 
(8b’)  iK ii yr k  ,     i = 1, 2  
(8c’)  iE ii yre  ,       i = 1, 2    
The linear version of the wage-bargaining equilibrium condition is: 

















, and ωi* is the proportional change in ω. 
The national government’s budget constraint is linearised as: 
(10’)    11 1 1 1 22 22 2 [( *) ( *) ] RVTY Y JJ JJ tn j n j              
11 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 [(1 ) ] [ ] ( ) ( ) RVE E RVE E EXGF EXGF p re p re n g n ng n                 
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,  θi* = dθi/θi.   
Region 1’s government budget constraint in linear form is given by: 
(11a’) 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 [(1 ) ( ) ( )] RVTW TWTW W U TWUB p tw u u u b           
   11 1 1 (* ) RV TY Y tjg r      , 
where 
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Similarly, for region 2’s government budget constraint we have: 
(11b’)  22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 [( ) ( ) ] RVTW TWTW W U TWUB p tw u u u b          
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The definition of the unemployment rate is linearised as: 
(12’) (1/ )( ) iU i i i un l   ,     i = 1, 2 
The definition of Gi is linearised as: 













   
The national employment constraint results in the following linearised condition: 
(14’)    11 22 NN nn n     
where  11 22 /, / NN NN NN    . 
The national capital constraint is linearised as:  
(15’)    11 22 KK kk k     
where  11 22 /, / KK K KK K     
The linearised form of the national emissions permits constraint is: 
(16’)   11 22 EE ee e     
where  11 22 /, / EE EE EE     
The profit distribution condition can be linearised to give: 
(17’)   ii i f nh    ,   i = 1, 2 
The final equation of the model is the balance of trade condition which, in linear 
form, is: 





Appendix 3: Data-Base 
Region C($m)  LW  ($m)  GN($m) GR($m) L ( ‘000) N ( ‘000) RkK($m) REE($m) 
UB(N-L) 
($m) TR($m)
Region  1  NSW  196376.0  149557.3  18545.4  35108.2 3286.5 3460.6  50031.8 4690.0 2836.7  23423.2 
Region  2  ROC  361787.4  280734.7  36333.6  71171.0 6667.1 6993.7  110763.6  11232.0 5323.0  43980.8 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Region  1  Vic 144591.6  109211.7  14830.2  26446.0 2542.8 2676.5  38373.6 3120.0 2178.9  17107.8 
Region  2  ROC  413571.8  321080.3  40048.8  79833.2 7410.9 7777.9  122421.9  12802.0 5980.9  50296.3 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Region  1  Qld 107950.4  84478.3  10591.8  21656.6 2068.0 2163.3  33185.9 6240.0 1553.7  13232.8 
Region  2  ROC  450213.0  345813.7  44287.2  84622.6 7885.7 8291.0  127609.5 9682.0 6606.0  54171.2 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Region  1  SA 41331.6  29415.9  4436.2  8612.2 757.3 798.5  10076.2 312.0 673.3  4607.7 
Region  2  ROC  516831.8  400876.1  50442.8  97667.0 9196.4 9655.8  150719.3  15610.0 7486.4  62796.4 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Region  1  WA 56082.8  49053.5 4949.0  11486.4 1074.6 1117.3  26359.6 1248.0  696.3 7689.1 
Region  2  ROC  502080.6  381238.5  49930.0  94792.8 8879.0 9337.0  134435.9  14674.0 7463.4  59714.9 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Region  1  Tas 11831.0  8575.2  1526.4  2969.8 224.5 238.1  2768.5 312.0 220.8  1343.5 
Region  2  ROC  546332.4  421716.8  53352.6  103309.4 9729.1  10216.3  158027.0  15610.0 7939.0  66060.5 
Nation  558163.4  430292.0  54879.0  106279.2 9953.6  10454.3  160795.4  15922.0 8159.7  67404.0 
Notes: Data for Ci, Li, LWi N, NG, GRi UB and TR are from ABS times series averaged over the period 
2004 – 2008. Capital income RkK is calculated by multiplying the capital stock by a rate of return of 








ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
2009 
DP NUMBER  AUTHORS  TITLE 
09.01  Le, A.T.  ENTRY INTO UNIVERSITY: ARE THE CHILDREN OF 
IMMIGRANTS DISADVANTAGED? 
09.02  Wu, Y.  CHINA’S CAPITAL STOCK SERIES BY REGION AND 
SECTOR 
09.03  Chen, M.H.  UNDERSTANDING WORLD COMMODITY PRICES 
RETURNS, VOLATILITY AND DIVERSIFACATION 
09.04  Velagic, R.  UWA DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS: THE FIRST 
650 
09.05  McLure, M.  ROYALTIES FOR REGIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
09.06  Chen, A. and Groenewold, N.  REDUCING REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN CHINA: AN 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
09.07  Groenewold, N. and Hagger, A.  THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
IMMIGRATION: SIMULATION RESULTS FROM A SMALL 
CGE MODEL. 
09.08  Clements, K. and Chen, D.  AFFLUENCE AND FOOD: SIMPLE WAY TO INFER 
INCOMES 
09.09  Clements, K. and Maesepp, M.  A SELF-REFLECTIVE INVERSE DEMAND SYSTEM 
09.10  Jones, C.  MEASURING WESTERN AUSTRALIAN HOUSE PRICES: 
METHODS AND IMPLICATIONS 
09.11  Siddique, M.A.B.  WESTERN AUSTRALIA-JAPAN MINING CO-OPERATION: 
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
09.12  Weber, E.J.  PRE-INDUSTRIAL BIMETALLISM: THE INDEX COIN 
HYPTHESIS 
09.13  McLure, M.  PARETO AND PIGOU ON OPHELIMITY, UTILITY AND 
WELFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC FINANCE 
09.14  Weber, E.J.  WILFRED EDWARD GRAHAM SALTER: THE MERITS OF 
A CLASSICAL ECONOMIC EDUCATION 
09.15  Tyers, R. and Huang, L.  COMBATING CHINA’S EXPORT CONTRACTION: FISCAL 
EXPANSION OR ACCELERATED INDUSTRIAL REFORM 
09.16  Zweifel, P., Plaff, D. and 
Kühn, J. 
IS REGULATING THE SOLVENCY OF BANKS COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE? 
09.17  Clements, K.  THE PHD CONFERENCE REACHES ADULTHOOD 
09.18  McLure, M.  THIRTY YEARS OF ECONOMICS: UWA AND THE WA 
BRANCH OF THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY FROM 1963 TO 
1992 
09.19  Harris, R.G. and Robertson, P.  TRADE, WAGES AND SKILL ACCUMULATION IN THE 
EMERGING GIANTS 
09.20  Peng, J., Cui, J., Qin, F. and 
Groenewold, N. 
STOCK PRICES AND THE MACRO ECONOMY IN CHINA 
09.21  Chen, A. and Groenewold, N.  REGIONAL EQUALITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 




ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
2010 
DP NUMBER  AUTHORS  TITLE 
10.01  Hendry, D.F.  RESEARCH AND THE ACADEMIC: A TALE OF 
TWO CULTURES 
10.02  McLure, M., Turkington, D. and 
Weber, E.J. 
A CONVERSATION WITH ARNOLD ZELLNER  
10.03  Butler, D.J., Burbank, V.K. and  
Chisholm, J.S. 
THE FRAMES BEHIND THE GAMES: PLAYER’S 
PERCEPTIONS OF PRISONER’S DILEMMA, 
CHICKEN, DICTATOR, AND ULTIMATUM GAMES  
10.04  Harris, R.G., Robertson, P.E. and Xu, 
J.Y. 
THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF CHINA’S 
GROWTH, TRADE AND EDUCATION BOOMS 
10.05  Clements, K.W., Mongey, S. and Si, J.  THE DYNAMICS OF NEW RESOURCE PROJECTS A 
PROGRESS REPORT 
10.06  Costello, G., Fraser, P.,  
Groenewold, N. 
HOUSE PRICES, NON-FUNDAMENTAL 
COMPONENTS AND INTERSTATE SPILLOVERS: 
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
10.07  Clements, K.  REPORT OF THE 2009 PHD CONFERENCE IN 
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
10.08  Robertson, P.E.  INVESTMENT LED GROWTH IN INDIA: HINDU 
FACT OR MYTHOLOGY? 
10.09  Fu, D., Wu, Y., Tang, Y.  THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS ON EXPORT 
PERFORMANCE 
10.10  Wu, Y.  INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
CHINA 
10.11  Stephens, B.J.  THE DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR FORCE 
STATUS AMONG INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS 
10.12  Davies, M.  FINANCING THE BURRA BURRA MINES, SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA: LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS AND 
RESOLUTIONS 
10.13  Tyers, R., Zhang, Y.  APPRECIATING THE RENMINBI 
10.14  Clements, K.W., Lan, Y., Seah, S.P.  THE BIG MAC INDEX TWO DECADES ON 
AN EVALUATION OF BURGERNOMICS 
10.15  Robertson, P.E., Xu, J.Y.   IN CHINA’S WAKE:  
HAS ASIA GAINED FROM CHINA’S GROWTH? 
10.16  Clements, K.W., Izan, H.Y.  THE PAY PARITY MATRIX: A TOOL FOR 
ANALYSING THE STRUCTURE OF PAY 
10.17  Gao, G.  WORLD FOOD DEMAND 
10.18  Wu, Y.  INDIGENOUS INNOVATION IN CHINA:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
10.19  Robertson, P.E.  DECIPHERING THE HINDU GROWTH EPIC 





10.21  Widmer, P.K., Zweifel, P., Farsi, M.  ACCOUNTING FOR HETEROGENEITY IN THE 
MEASUREMENT OF HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE 
10.22  McLure, M.  ASSESSMENTS OF A. C. PIGOU’S FELLOWSHIP 
THESES 
10.23  Poon, A.R.  THE ECONOMICS OF NONLINEAR PRICING: 
EVIDENCE FROM AIRFARES AND GROCERY 
PRICES 
10.24  Halperin, D.  FORECASTING METALS RETURNS: A BAYESIAN 
DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH 
10.25  Clements, K.W., Si. J.  THE INVESTMENT PROJECT PIPELINE: COST 
ESCALATION, LEAD-TIME, SUCCESS, FAILURE 
AND SPEED 
10.26  Chen, A., Groenewold, N., 
Hagger, A.J. 
THE  REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A 
REDUCTION IN CARBON EMISSIONS 
10.27  Siddique, A., Selvanathan, E.A., 
Selvanathan, S. 
REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH, 
INDIA AND SRI LANKA 
 
 